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Abstract 
There is an ongoing discussion in Germany about the implementation of tax credits in order 
to reintegrate low-skilled workers into the labor market. This paper aims at analyzing the 
policy instrument of tax credits in a theoretical model that systematically compares its costs 
and benefits in the context of the German system of apprenticeship training and social 
security. Building on recent training literature, a two-period partial-equilibrium model is 
developed that allows for worker heterogeneity in ability. 
In our model, the implementation of tax credits in terms of a negative income tax solves a 
trade-off with respect to overall welfare. While tax credits reduce the number of 
unemployed workers at the extensive margin, they increase at the same time the 
opportunity costs of apprenticeship training, which implies that human capital formation is 
decreased. Furthermore, the model suggests that the reintegration of those workers at the 
bottom of the ability-distribution into the labor market is not optimal. The additional 
implementation of minimum wages is counteractive to the reduction of unemployment 
because firms would thus be prevented from employing workers with very low 
productivities. 
Keywords 
Unemployment of Low-Skilled Workers, Tax Credits, Labor Supply, Human Capital 
Formation 
JEL Classification 
H31, I38, J21, J24, J31, J68 1 Introduction
There is an ongoing discussion in Germany about the implementation of tax credits in order to reintegrate
those low-skilled workers into the labor market who would stay outside otherwise. Since the seventies,
Germany has experienced a dramatic increase in structural unemployment.1 The German labor markets
are particularly challenged by increasing unemployment among workers with low qualiﬁcation.2 This
unemployment of low-skilled workers is very high in Germany compared to other OECD countries. Fur-
thermore, German unemployment, like in most European countries, is largely made up of individuals
suﬀering long spells (OECD (2004)). According to recent analyses of the IMF that concentrate on the
labor supply of workers, one major reason lies in the compressed wage structure, i.e. in the downward
rigidity in wages across skill categories (IMF (2004) and IMF (2005)).3 This wage compression accrues
because labor markets are heavily regulated and the level of unemployment beneﬁts is high. Especially
the German labor markets are characterized by a high level of employment protection and strong unions
in the process of collective wage setting as well as downward rigidities with respect to wages of unskilled
workers. In a nutshell, low-skilled workers stay outside the labor market because their potential labor
income falls below the level of unemployment beneﬁts deﬁned by the German system of social security
(Sinn, Holzner, Meister, Ochel, and Werding (2006)).
In order to approach the problem of rising unemployment among low-skilled workers, tax credits
are proposed depending on the level of individual income. This policy instrument is part of the so-
called welfare-to-work strategy which should reduce poverty by raising employment of low-skilled workers
rather than by increasing welfare beneﬁts for the unemployed. The objective is to balance assistance
of low-income families and employment incentives for low-skilled workers. If a worker decides to work
regularly, he receives an individual subsidy which depends on his level of income. One subsidy scheme
which has been extensively discussed in the literature is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the
US. Unfortunately, the theoretical analysis of tax credits in the context of both labor supply and training
decision of workers has been fragmentary so far. Previous research on tax credits has mainly focused on
their eﬀects on labor supply and employment (for example Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001)), whereas the
impact on skill formation has been widely neglected. There are only few investigations that also refer
to the consequences for the acquisition of human capital (for example Heckman, Lochner, and Cossa
(2002)).
This paper aims at closing this gap by developing a two-period partial-equilibrium model that sys-
tematically compares the costs and beneﬁts of tax credits. It is important to incorporate the training
decision into the analysis of tax credits because subsidies to low-skilled workers increase the opportunity
costs of training and thus reduce the worker’s incentives to acquire skills (Heckman (2002)). In a nutshell,
there are three key questions considered in this paper: First, what is the impact of tax credits on labor
1Cf. Bertola (2001) and Nickell (1997).
2In 2000, the rate of unemployment among workers without formal education was 19.4% in West Germany. In East
Germany, 50.3% of low-skilled workers were unemployed (Reinberg and Hummel (2002)).
3Note that wage compression in imperfect labor markets is considered to be the major source of ﬁrm-sponsored general
training (Acemoglu (1997) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1998)). However, this aspect is neglected because we concentrate
on the labor supply and training decision of workers.
1supply at the extensive margin? Second, what are the eﬀects of tax credits on human capital formation?
And third, what is the optimal level of tax credits subject to the training decision of workers?
The contribution of this paper is twofold because the formal analysis of tax credits, which is based on
recent training literature with oligopsonistic labor markets, is extended in two important ways. First, we
bring together the theoretical explanations of labor supply and human capital formation in the context
of the German system of apprenticeship training and social security. Immervoll, Kleven, Kreiner, and
Saez (2005) suggest that a model with unemployment due to labor market imperfections increases the
attractiveness of tax credits and reduces the desirability of traditional social assistance like unemployment
beneﬁts. We demonstrate that tax credits in terms of a negative income tax4 indeed succeed in reducing
the number of unemployed workers, but only at the cost of decreased human capital formation. This
conclusion is in line with the simulation results of Heckman, Lochner, and Cossa (2002). Second, our
model allows for worker heterogeneity in ability and manages to explain endogenously the labor supply
and training decision of workers at the extensive margin.
In our model, the implementation of tax credits in terms of a negative income tax solves a trade-oﬀ with
respect to overall welfare. While tax credits reduce the number of unemployed workers at the extensive
margin, they increase at the same time the opportunity costs of apprenticeship training, which implies
that human capital formation is decreased. Our formal analysis demonstrates that optimal tax credits are
positively related to the level of unemployment beneﬁts and the costs of apprenticeship training. However,
they depend negatively on the productivity-enhancement of apprenticeship training. Furthermore, the
model suggests that the reintegration of those workers at the bottom of the ability-distribution into the
labor market is not optimal. Because the costs in terms of decreased human capital formation would be
too high, it is more eﬃcient to leave aside those workers with the lowest productivities. The additional
implementation of minimum wages is counteractive to the reduction of unemployment because ﬁrms
would thus be prevented from employing workers with very low productivities.
The paper proceeds as follows: the next section discusses the theory of labor supply and human
capital formation and its relationship to the literature on tax credits. In section 3 of this paper, the
institutional setting of the German system of apprenticeship training and social security is illustrated. In
section 4, our partial-equilibrium model is developed and the laissez-faire equilibrium without tax credits
is discussed. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the implementation of unemployment beneﬁts generates
unemployment among low-skilled workers because private employment is crowded out by the welfare
state. In section 5, the implementation of tax credits in terms of a negative income tax is analyzed and
the optimal level of tax credits is derived. Section 6 concludes.
4This design of tax credits corresponds to the proposition of the ifo institute (Sinn, Holzner, Meister, Ochel, and Werding
(2006)) which is introduced in section 3.3.
22 The Theory of Labor Supply and Human Capital
2.1 The Concept of Tax Credits
As a consequence of social security and downward rigidities in wages across skill categories, workers
with low qualiﬁcation have become less employable (Phelps (1997)).5 Hence, economic policy should
promote wage ﬂexibility in order to reduce unemployment among these low-skilled workers. In this
context, incentives for unemployment should be reduced by decreasing the level of unemployment beneﬁts.
However, the implementation of these policy instruments is diﬃcult because of political constraints or
because taxes and social assistance are set by distinct political institutions based on rather diﬀerent
interests (Boone and Bovenberg (2004)).6
In order to approach the problem of rising unemployment among low-skilled workers, tax credits are
proposed depending on the level of individual labor income. This implies that the government pays a
subsidy to those workers who are employed regularly and whose income does not exceed some critical
level (Phelps (1997)). Tax credits are an important policy instrument to increase employment without
lowering the standard of living because regular wages of unskilled workers are very low (the so-called
"working poor") (Snower (1994)). However, compared to traditional social assistance, tax credits are
less targeted at the poorest agents who suﬀer from involuntary unemployment (Boone and Bovenberg
(2006)).
To some extent tax credits can be classiﬁed within the general set of wage subsidies.7 However, wage
subsidies are individually based, not means-tested and with limited duration (Phelps (1997)). Eligibility
usually depends on a certain duration of receipt for the unemployment insurance. On the other hand,
tax credits are typically subject to a family income based means-test and do not show a time limitation
(Blundell (2005)). In the last years, several countries have introduced tax credits in various forms. In
Europe, the most important examples are the Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) in the UK, the
In-Work Tax Credit in Belgium, the Family Income Support Programme in Ireland and the Employment
Tax Credit in the Netherlands (OECD (2005)). However, theoretical and empirical research has mainly
focused on the Earned Income Tax Credits (EITC) in the US. This transfer scheme works as a tax credit
for workers with low labor incomes up to some critical level beyond which the subsidy is phased out. The
EITC aims at reducing working poverty as well as generating greater work incentives for unemployed and
workers with low income (Steuerle (1990)).
2.1.1 The Negative Income Tax
Based on Mirrlees (1971), optimal income tax theory shows that redistribution should take the form of a
negative income tax (NIT) in order to reduce the high marginal tax rates on traditional social assistance
5This result is formally derived in section 4.4.
6For example, in some federal countries local governments determine social beneﬁts while the central government decides
about the tax system.
7Orszag and Snower (2003) distinguish between wage subsidies, which are paid to all workers with low income and not
limited in time, and hiring subsidies, which are targeted exclusively at unemployed workers and limited in time.
3(Immervoll, Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2005)). In general, the traditional NIT implies the following tax
scheme which depends on the level of individual labor income:
T (I) = tI − y
￿
≤ 0 if I ≤ ¯ I ≡
y
t
> 0 if I > ¯ I
￿
(1)
The NIT implies that all individuals receive a basic lump-sum transfer y which thus corresponds to the
guaranteed income of each worker. Hence, workers with low income I below the critical level ¯ I face a
negative amount of tax liability, i.e. they receive an income subsidy from the government. With increasing
individual labor income, the subsidy is reduced by some portion of labor income which means that the
labor income is taxed at the rate t.
In a general equilibrium model with continuous distribution of abilities, Hanushek, Leung, and Yilmaz
(2003) investigate diﬀerent redistribution policies and their implications for labor supply and human
capital formation with respect to the trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency. They conclude that wage
subsidies, which are only directed to uneducated workers, dominate the implementation of education
subsidies and a traditional NIT. By incorporating both margins of labor supply into the original approach
of Mirrlees (1971), Saez (2002) analyzes the welfare consequences of the traditional NIT and the EITC.
He demonstrates that subsidizing low-income workers by tax credits is welfare-enhancing if the labor
supply response is concentrated along the extensive margin (participation).8
2.1.2 Implications of Tax Credits for Labor Supply
A central ﬁnding of the recent empirical literature in public ﬁnance and labor economics is that labor
supply responses are concentrated more at the extensive margin than at the intensive margin (hours of
work) (Blundell and MaCurdy (1999)). Evidence from tax-based transfers in the US and the UK shows
substantial positive eﬀects at the extensive margin, but only small negative eﬀects on hours of work
for those workers who already stay inside the labor market (Eissa and Liebman (1996) for the US and
Blundell and Hoynes (2001) for the UK). Eissa, Kleven, and Kreiner (2004) stress that the extensive
margin is particularly important for the labor supply incentives at the bottom of the income distribution.
With respect to the EITC, the empirical analysis by Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) shows that indeed
annual employment of single mothers has increased by 9% between 1984 and 1996.9 However, hours
worked have only slightly fallen at the intensive margin. Because the eﬀect on total hours worked is very
similar to the increase in employment, Meyer (2002) argues that labor supply adjustments take place
at the extensive margin but not at the intensive margin. In almost the same manner, Heckman (1993)
concludes that the extensive margin is empirically much more important than the intensive margin.
8Boone and Bovenberg (2004) suggest that there is a trade-oﬀ between low-skilled employment at the extensive margin
and work eﬀort of high-skilled workers at the intensive margin.
9Single mothers represent over three-quarters of all EITC recipients (Eissa and Hoynes (2005)). Meyer and Rosenbaum
(2001) estimate that 60% of this increase in extensive labor supply is due to the EITC. For single mothers, this labor
supply response at the extensive margin is conﬁrmed by Eissa and Hoynes (2004). However, this result may be changed if
an integrated model of family labor supply is considered (Hausman (1985)). Indeed, Eissa and Hoynes (2004) object that
their results are diﬀerent for married couples. While the labor force participation of the head of families is increased, it is
decreased for secondary earners. In aggregate, the overall family labor supply is reduced among married couples.
4With respect to European countries, Immervoll, Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2005) use the EUROMOD
micro-simulation model to demonstrate that tax credits generate positive labor supply responses at the
extensive margin.
Furthermore, the evidence from the NIT Experiments in the US suggests that the participation
response is larger than the response at the intensive margin for both single female heads and married
women (Robins (1985)).10 Hence, labor supply adjustments take place at the extensive margin, which
is mainly aﬀected by the NIT guarantee, but only slightly at the intensive margin, which is inﬂuenced
by the NIT tax rate. In line with Hausman (1985), we conclude that the basic transfer y is much more
important for the labor supply response of low-income workers than the tax component t.
The reason for the dominance of the extensive margin could be that hours worked are ﬁxed so that
workers face quantity restrictions if they decide to enter the labor market (Hausman (1985)).11 Simpli-
fying, workers have the discrete choice between work and unemployment but can hardly decide on hours
worked at the intensive margin (Zabalza, Pissarides, and Barton (1080)).12 Indeed, empirical evidence
shows that workers decide either to stay out of the labor market or to work at least some minimum
number of hours (Eissa, Kleven, and Kreiner (2005)). This discrete labor supply behavior is theoretically
explained by non-convexities generated by ﬁxed costs of working (Cogan (1981)). With respect to the
evaluation of tax reforms, Eissa and Hoynes (2005) suggest that ignoring the participation margin can
lead to even the wrong sign of the welfare eﬀect. Unfortunately, the theoretical public ﬁnance literature
has largely ignored the participation decision and instead has focused on labor supply at the intensive
margin. Hence, it is important to construct a theoretical model that explicitly allows for labor supply
responses at the extensive margin if the incomes of low-skilled workers are raised by tax credits.
2.2 Human Capital Formation
"Human capital" can be deﬁned as knowledge, skills, attitudes, aptitudes, and other acquired traits
contributing to production (Goode (1959)). According to Blundell, Dearden, Meghir, and Sianesi (1999),
there are two main components of human capital with strong complementarity: early ability (whether
acquired or innate) and skills acquired through formal education or training on the job. An extensive
review of the theory of human capital is given by Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004).
10The NIT experiments were randomized experiments conducted from 1968 to 1982 in order to investigate the impact of
taxes on labor supply. By considering both substitution and income eﬀects, labor supply at the intensive margin is reduced
by the NIT (Barth and Greenberg (1971)).
In a model without unemployment beneﬁts, this result is empirically conﬁrmed by Robins and West (1980) who demon-
strate that due to the NIT there is a signiﬁcant reduction in labor supply by heads of families once the participation decision
is controled for. However, the opposite is true if there have been unemployment beneﬁts which are replaced by the NIT.
11In addition to these institutional restrictions, Eissa and Hoynes (2005) summarize further reasons why the extensive
margin is more responsive than the intensive margin.
12With quantity restrictions, labor supply can be estimated by discrete choice models that allow for a distribution of
preferences (Zabalza, Pissarides, and Barton (1080)). Also Diamond (1980) focuses on the case in which labor supply is
reduced to a participation decision.
52.2.1 The Investment in Human Capital
In his original approach, Becker (1964) develops a model of individual investment in human capital. In this
view, human capital is similar to "physical means of production". According to Becker (1962), investing in
human capital means "all activities that inﬂuence future real income through the embedding of resources
in people". Human capital investments are expenditures on education, training, health, information, and
labor mobility (Weisbrod (1966)). They involve initial costs (direct tuition expenditures and foregone
earnings during schooling)13 in order to gain a return on this investment in the future (Becker (1992)).14
In a nutshell, Mincer (1970) summarizes the empirical evidence concerning the age-earnings proﬁle of
individuals. Earnings positively depend on the stock of human capital; the age-earnings proﬁle is concave
and at least for a long time upward-sloping. If human capital investment increases, the age-earnings
proﬁle becomes steeper and has its maximum later.
Becker (1964) distinguishes between general and speciﬁc human capital. General human capital
is deﬁned to be not only useful with the current employer but also with other potential employers.
In contrast, speciﬁc human capital increases the productivity of the worker only in his current job.15
Hence, in competitive labor markets, where workers receive wages equal to their marginal product, ﬁrms
cannot recoup investments in general skills, so that they refuse to pay for general training. However,
workers themselves have the right incentives to invest in general human capital because they are the sole
beneﬁciaries of their improved productivity (either with their current or with future employers) (Becker
(1962)). If workers are not credit constrained, they eﬃciently invest in the accumulation of general human
capital. On the other hand, Becker (1964) argues that training in speciﬁc skills is quite diﬀerent because
workers do not beneﬁt from higher productivity after changing their jobs. Therefore, ﬁrms can recoup
investments in speciﬁc skills and are thus willing to share some of the costs of these investments. By also
sharing the returns, the accumulation of speciﬁc human capital leads to lower ﬂuctuations because both
ﬁrms and workers beneﬁt from keeping their contractual partner.
Models of human capital accumulation over the life-cycle can be attributed to two diﬀerent branches:
earnings maximizing models and utility maximizing models. Earnings maximizing models abstract from
the labor-leisure choice problem and only analyze the trade-oﬀ between investment and income (for
example Ben-Porath (1967)). Utility maximizing models also incorporate the labor-leisure choice so that
labor supply becomes endogenous to the model (for example Heckman (1976)).16 In both types of models,
human capital formation is rivalrous with working so that wage subsidies run the risk of discouraging
investments in skills (Heckman, Lochner, and Cossa (2002)).
13Parsons (1974) distinguishes these major components of education costs.
14This return is based on two interrelated channels: increased earnings for the worker and higher productivity for the
ﬁrm as well as increased employment probabilities (Bloch and Smith (1977)). Bloch and Smith (1977) indeed ﬁnd a
positive correlation of human capital and labor market employment. Also Mincer (1989) states that the probability of
being unemployed decreases with the amount of education. In a nutshell, there are two key determinants of the return to
education: the costs of education and the employment opportunities after education (Rephann (2002)).
15Parsons (1974) notes that this ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital is analytically equivalent to transfer costs for adjusting a
worker to other ﬁrms.
16The diﬀerence between these two types of models is illustrated by Snow and Warren (1990) who explain that the income
eﬀect of higher wages (due to investments in human capital) on future labor supply may reduce realized future earnings.
However, there are eﬀorts to integrate these two branches (for example Blinder and Weiss (1976)).
6Besides this vast literature on life-cycle human capital investment, there is a strand of literature
concentrating on the extensive margin. This extensive education decision divides the workforce into
diﬀerent skill groups such as low-skilled and high-skilled workers. This mostly empirical literature analyzes
self-selection of students into skill groups according to ability types which aﬀects estimates of occupational
choice and thus the distribution of earnings.17 For example, Willis and Rosen (1979) as well as Heckman,
Lochner, and Taber (1998) derive a theoretical model of the demand for college attendance and empirically
show that expected lifetime earnings diﬀerentials indeed inﬂuence the college attendance choice.
2.2.2 Implications of Tax Credits for Human Capital Formation
Not only labor supply but also human capital formation is aﬀected by the implementation of tax credits.
These eﬀects could be very diﬀerent and crucially depend on the design of transfer schemes. With
respect to the EITC, the consequences for the acquisition of human capital are neglected by many
contributions.18 According to the analysis of Heckman, Lochner, and Cossa (2002), tax credits place
important disincentives on the accumulation of human capital. They suggest that the average skill-level
of workers is decreased because current workers reduce their investment in human capital at the intensive
margin.19 As a consequence, Blundell (2005) stresses the importance of these interactions between labor
supply and human capital formation for further research. He suggests that a dynamic analysis of optimal
income transfer programs has to take into account the incentive eﬀects for human capital investments.
3 The Institutional Setting in Germany
3.1 The German System of Apprenticeship Training
The educational system of Germany is one of the most segregated among industrialized countries. There
are four types of German secondary schools: lower (Hauptschule), middle (Realschule), upper (Gymna-
sium), and mixed (Gesamtschule). Upon their conclusion, all of these school tracks require the successful
completion of exams which indicate whether students are qualiﬁed to enter into an apprenticeship, other
vocational training, or the university (Cooke (2003)).
Apprenticeship training can be undertaken in a variety of skilled blue or white collar positions. It
combines part-time schooling with a work-based component (the so-called "dual system") and is largely
general. Firms oﬀering apprenticeship training positions have to follow a prescribed curriculum and
apprentices take a rigorous exam at the end of the apprenticeship. Industry or craft chambers certify
whether ﬁrms fulﬁll the requirements to train apprentices adequately, while worker councils in the ﬁrms
17The ﬁrst source is Roy (1951), which has received subsequent elaboration, e.g. by Heckman and Honoré (1990).
18For example, Orszag and Snower (2003) admit that consequences for the accumulation of human capital lie beyond the
scope of their paper.
19The eﬀects of the EITC on human capital investments are devided into a substitution eﬀect, an income eﬀect, and a
direct eﬀect (which accrues due to changes in marginal costs and returns) (Heckman, Lochner, and Cossa (2002)).
7monitor the training. After having passed the exam, apprentices receive a formal skill certiﬁcate that is
accepted nationwide (Bougheas and Georgellis (2004)).20
In a nutshell, the accumulation of human capital by apprenticeship training is determined by pub-
lic regulations rather than investment decisions of workers at the intensive margin (hours of training).
However, each worker decides at the extensive margin (participation) whether to receive apprenticeship
training or to work regularly (i.e. to work full time without formal qualiﬁcation).
3.2 Labor Market Regulation and Social Security in Germany
In Germany, the degree of labor market regulation is high compared to other OECD countries (OECD
(2005)). Laws of employment protection and ﬁring costs make it diﬃcult for ﬁrms to respond ﬂexibly
to changing market conditions. With ﬁring costs, job growth in response to GDP growth is diminished
because ﬁrms account for the possibility of worsening business prospects in the future. Hence, they
hire fewer workers or even decide to leave the market in order to avoid the costs of possibly having to
ﬁre them. As a consequence, it becomes harder to ﬁnd a job for unemployed workers (Heckman (2002)).
However, the total eﬀect of ﬁring costs on unemployment is ambiguous because the separating probability
for employed workers is decreased and fewer separations lead to lower unemployment (Belot, Boone, and
Ours (2002)).21
Wage bargaining is conducted by the collective bargaining parties. Although Germany does not have
a legally mandated minimum wage, union wage ﬂoors eﬀectively operate as wage minimums for certain
groups of workers. Furthermore, replacement rates by social insurance are substantial. In the sixties, the
social assistance beneﬁts Arbeitslosenhilfe and Sozialhilfe were implemented to insure workers against the
risk of unemployment. According to Immervoll, Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2005), total social beneﬁts
constituted 72.6% of the disposable income for the lowest decile group in Germany in 1998.
However, this system of traditional social assistance is criticized for keeping persons on welfare and
out of the labor market.22 This poverty trap accrues because unemployment beneﬁts work as de facto
minimum wage. This downward rigidity in wages across skill-categories leads to a compressed wage
structure (Schöb and Weimann (2003)). As a consequence, unemployment is generated especially among
low-skilled workers because private employment is crowded out by the welfare state as long as the replace-
ment rate exceeds the market wage rate for unskilled workers (Sinn (2003)). According to Reinberg and
Hummel (2002), the rate of unemployment in 2000 among workers without formal education was 19.4%
20For example, the German system of apprenticeship training is described by Soskice (1994) and Harhoﬀ and Kane (1995).
21The empirical evidence concerning the relationship between ﬁring costs and unemployment is mixed. For example,
Scarpetta (1996) and Elmeskov, Marint, and Scarpetta (1998) ﬁnd a negative correlation whereas Nickell (1998) does not.
Note that there is another implication of the decreased separating probability: ﬁrms invest more in the human capital
of their workers because the expected rent from the increased output of trained workers is higher. The empirical evidence
concerning this positive relationship between training and job tenure is unambiguous (Lynch (1991) and Loewenstein and
Spletzer (1999)).
22In 1999, 2,790,000 people draw beneﬁts from the Sozialhilfe and 1,300,000 from the Arbeitslosenhilfe. Subject to health
condition, family obligation and training measures, the labor force potential is 2,200,000 or about 58% of all beneﬁciaries
(Raﬀelhüschen (2001)).
8in West Germany and 50.3% in East Germany.23 Because social beneﬁts are generously granted only in
the case of no work and marginal tax rates on unemployment beneﬁts are high, labor supply incentives
for low-skilled workers are reduced by the welfare state (Sinn (2002)).
In the context of the German labor market reforms in 2005, both social assistance beneﬁts were merged
to the uniform social beneﬁt Arbeitslosengeld II which falls below the previous replacement rates and is
independent of earnings in the past. Furthermore, the requirements of eligibility and sanctions in the
case of misuse were aggravated.24 However, the negative impact on employment of low-skilled workers
is reduced but still existent (Ochel (2005)). The alternative to this traditional form of social assistance
are tax credits granted to those workers who stay inside the labor market but receive a low labor income
below some critical level.
3.3 The German Concept of "Combined Wages"
In Germany, two diﬀerent concepts of tax credits are discussed which both aim at reintegrating low-skilled
workers into the labor market. This policy instrument is referred to as "combined wages" because the
income of low-skilled workers in employment is augmented so that the total income is a combination of
the individual labor income and the subsidy. The ﬁrst concept of "combined wages" concentrates on the
demand side of the labor market and proposes to pay employment subsidies to those ﬁrms that hire a
formerly unemployed worker. In this context, some part of the unemployment beneﬁts could be used
as vouchers for the ﬁrms in order to reduce the net labor costs. Hence, each worker will prefer work to
unemployment if his gross labor income exceeds the employment subsidy (Snower (1994)). With respect
to the institutional setting in Germany, Schöb and Weimann (2003) suggest to exempt ﬁrms from paying
the social security contributions for low-skilled workers in order to decrease the labor costs of ﬁrms by
34% (this proposition is called the Magdeburger Alternative). However, in our formal analysis we will
focus on the second concept of "combined wages" that refers to the supply side of the labor market. This
approach aims at increasing the labor supply incentives of low-skilled workers by paying them a subsidy
in the case of employment.
In recent years, there have been various approaches to implement tax credits according to the second
concept of "combined wages". The focus of most approaches has been on long-time unemployed, welfare
recipients, or generally workers with low qualiﬁcation. Besides some regionally deﬁned projects25, two
approaches have been applied nationwide. First, the Arbeitnehmerhilfe determines wage subsidies for
unemployed workers of at most 13 Euro per day if the working time exceeds 15 hours per week. Second,
the Mainzer Modell was regionally designed in 200026, extended nationwide in 2002 and terminated by
23Empirical evidence is also shown by Layard and Nickell (1999). These negative eﬀects become even stronger in a
dynamic context, for the longer workers are unemployed and the more their skills depreciate (Snower (1994)). The existence
of unemployment due to the implementation of unemployment beneﬁts is formally derived in section 4.4.
24According to Peter Hartz, the chairman of the committee working on these labor market reforms, this part of the reform
proposals is also referred to as Hartz IV.
25An overview is given by Kaltenborn (2001). For example, nine local authorities in the federal state Baden-Württemberg
applied the Einstiegsgeld between 1999 and 2002 (Dann, Kirchmann, Spermann, and Volkert (2002)). In Hessen, "combined
wages" were introduced by seven local authorities in 2000. It was hardly engaged and replaced by the Kasseler Modell
Kombilohn (KAMOKO) in 2001. Like the Mainzer Modell, it was terminated in 2003.
26At the beginning, it was only designed for the federal states Rheinland-Pfalz and Brandenburg.
9the end of 2003. It was composed of subsidies to social security contributions and child beneﬁts for
a minimum working time of 15 hours per week and a gross income of at least 325 Euro per month.
For a family with two children, the two components add up to a maximum subsidy of 283 Euro per
month.27 However, the main problem of both approaches has been their limited time horizon. The
maximum duration of advancement has been three years in the Mainzer Modell and only three months
in the Arbeitnehmerhilfe (Kaltenborn (2003)). As a consequence, the demand of workers for these wage
subsidies has been very low considering the enormous amount of more than two millions of unemployed
workers with low qualiﬁcation.28
The limited time horizon of these tax credit programs is the main criticism brought forward by the ifo
institute, an economic research institute in Germany. Low-skilled workers should have to be subsidized
permanently because their income permanently falls below the reservation wage as deﬁned by the level of
unemployment beneﬁts (Sinn, Holzner, Meister, Ochel, and Werding (2006)). Furthermore, the previous
concepts still face high marginal tax rates on social welfare beneﬁts so that working incentives for low-
skilled workers are reduced (Sinn (2002)). Hence, tax credits for workers in employment are proposed
according to the concept of a NIT in order to generate stronger labor supply incentives. However, this
assistance is fundamentally diﬀerent from the traditional concept of a NIT: subsidies are only paid to
those workers inside the labor market (Sinn, Holzner, Meister, Ochel, and Werding (2006)).29
Starting from these considerations, our model analyzes labor supply and training responses at the
extensive margin. It refers to the concept of the ifo institute by designing tax credits in terms of a NIT
for workers in employment. In order to analyze the eﬀects of tax credits on labor market participation at
the extensive margin, it is essential to consider all distortions generated by traditional social assistance
that move the equilibrium away from its ﬁrst-best optimum. By granting additional income only in the
case of employment, some formerly unemployed workers will thus be motivated to enter the labor market
because the combination of their own labor income plus the subsidy will make them better oﬀ than in
the case of unemployment. The welfare analysis of tax credits is presented in section 5. Beforehand, we
discuss the laissez-faire equilibrium (cf. section 4.3) and the equilibrium with unemployment beneﬁts (cf.
section 4.4) in order to point out the analytical basis of comparison.
4 The Model
We consider a discrete-time model with two types of agents, namely workers and ﬁrms. In line with
Acemoglu and Pischke (1998), there are two periods, a training period (period 1) and a working period
(period 2). The length of both periods is normalized to unity. Production takes place in worker-ﬁrm pairs
and no capital is needed. According to Eissa, Kleven, and Kreiner (2005), a model of extensive labor
27Cf. Jülicher (2002) and Bittner, Hollederer, Kaltenborn, Rudolph, Vanselow, and Weinkopf (2001).
28The Arbeitnehmerhilfe covers about 8.000 workers per year. There were 6.137 participants in the Mainzer Modell
(Dann, Kirchmann, Spermann, and Volkert (2002)).
29The ifo institute deﬁnes this concept as "activating social aid". This means that social beneﬁts are paid in order to
activate formally unemployed workers for the labor market. The whole concept is explained in more detail in Sinn, Holzner,
Meister, Ochel, and Werding (2006).
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Figure 1: Evolution over Time
supply requires some type of heterogeneity, either in preferences or in ability. In our approach, workers
have identical preferences but are heterogeneous in their initial ability which is exogenously given.
At the beginning of period 1, each ﬁrm meets one worker whose individual ability is drawn randomly
from a distribution that is common knowledge. Firms and workers decide whether to engage in appren-
ticeship training, to produce with regular work or to stay in the market at all. Apprenticeship training
only takes place if both parties prefer it to regular work. If one of the parties does not agree, the worker is
employed regularly. In the second period, all workers are employed regularly, but only those workers who
were trained in period 1 have increased productivity. In line with Acemoglu and Pischke (1999), there is
no exogenous separation after the ﬁrst period.30 Altogether, the economy evolves over time as shown in
ﬁgure 1. The model assumptions and the labor market decisions of ﬁrms and workers are described in
the following subsections.
4.1 Workers and Firms
At the beginning of period 1, workers diﬀer in their individual ability that is assumed to be uniformly
distributed on the interval [θL,θH].31 Firms can unambiguously observe the workers’ abilities.32 In
line with Hanushek, Leung, and Yilmaz (2003) and Malcomson, Maw, and McCormick (2003), the mass
of workers is normalized to unity by deﬁning θL ≡ 0 and θH ≡ 1. Hence, the cumulative distribution
function of individual abilities is F(θ) = θ. By assumption, the mass of ﬁrms is also one, so that each ﬁrm
meets one worker whose ability is uniformly distributed with θ ∼ u[0,1]. At the extensive margin, each
worker decides whether to receive apprenticeship training, to work regularly or to stay unemployed. The
worker only has this discrete choice but cannot decide on the amount of apprenticeship training at the
30The implementation of an exogenous separating probability as in Malcomson, Maw, and McCormick (2003) does not
change our analytical results because we concentrate on the supply side of the labor market. For the workers who face the
training decision in period 1, it is irrelevant whether their higher wages in period 2 are paid by their current or by another
employer.
31The continuous distribution of abilities allows to obtain a smooth participation decision at the individual level (Mirrlees
(1971)). Mincer (1958) and Becker (1962) assume that abilities are normally distributed. Without changing our general
results, we assume a uniform distribution of abilities in order to keep the following calculations as simple as possible.
32This assumption is in line with Boone and Bovenberg (2006). Furthermore, it is implicitly included into the whole
literature on human capital and the life-cycle of earnings. Each worker oﬀers his individual stock of human capital to the
ﬁrms and is rewarded by a rental price per unit of human capital. Hence, we rule out asymmetric information (hidden
knowledge). If the worker’s productivity were not observed by the ﬁrm, there would be adverse selection as modeled e.g.
by de Meza and Webb (2001).
11intensive margin. This assumption is justiﬁed by the institutional setting of the German apprenticeship
system as described in section 3.1.
In line with Malcomson, Maw, and McCormick (2003), workers are risk-neutral and maximize the
sum of their discounted utilities over both periods:33
U (θ) = u + δu′ (2)
The discount factor δ ≡ 1
1+r with r as the market interest rate expresses the preference for current and
future utility. The higher δ, the higher is the weighting of period 2 and the lower is the preference for
period 1.
In period 1, the worker’s utility is equal to the diﬀerence between consumption c and potential training
costs e that only arise if training takes place:
u = c − υe (3)
c = w(θ) − s (4)
w(θ) = βθ (5)
υ is a dummy variable which is one in the case of apprenticeship training and zero otherwise. In line with
the literature on human capital accumulation over the life-cycle, there are training costs e that have to
be borne by the worker in the case of an apprenticeship.34 Note that the training costs are identical for
each worker because the length of the apprenticeship is deﬁned by the German system of apprenticeship
training (cf. section 3.1). In both periods, the worker’s wage corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution
of oligopsonistic labor markets. According to Acemoglu (1997), the parameter 0 < β < 1 indicates
the (identical) bargaining power of workers concerning the division of output. Hence, there are labor
market frictions because the worker’s wage is below his marginal product (Masters (1998)). By deﬁning
the output good as numéraire and assuming an identical, linear one-to-one production function for the
connection of output and labor (which is the only factor of production), the wage of a worker with ability
θ is equal to w(θ) = βθ.35 Furthermore, the worker can transfer wealth from period 1 to period 2 by
reducing his consumption c and saving an amount s.
33In line with Ben-Porath (1967), we do not analyze a more general utility function of workers. Note that there is no
uncertainty because the probability of exogenous separation is zero.
34Cf. Ben-Porath (1967) and Heckman (1976). Most models that analyze the accumulation of (general) human capital
over the life-cycle completely concentrate on the investment decision of workers.
Alternatively, the parameter e could be interpreted as ﬁxed costs according to Cogan (1981) in order to create non-
convexities in the training decision. However, we do not consider disutilities of work eﬀort in order to keep the calculations
as simple as possible. By including eﬀort of regular work, there would be unemployment also in the ﬁrst-best optimum and
in the laissez-faire equilibrium (cf. e.g. Immervoll, Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2005)).
35The production function exhibits constant returns to scale. Note that the wage w(θ) corresponds to the labor income
of the worker with individual ability θ because the labor supply is implicitly normalized to unity.















′ = (1 + υα)θ (9)
Consumption c′ is determined by the savings of period 1, that are augmented by the factor R ≡ 1 + r,
and the wage in period 2 which corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution and thus depends on the
worker’s productivity θ
′. The productivity of all workers employed regularly in period 1 is unchanged (i.e.
θ
′ = θ). For all trained workers (i.e. υ = 1), productivity in the second period increases to θ
′ = (1 + α)θ.
The parameter α > 0 represents the productivity-enhancement of apprenticeship training: the higher
θ, the higher is the absolute productivity gain generated by the apprenticeship.37 We assume that the
productivity-enhancement α is identical for all trained workers.38
Altogether, the total utility of a worker with ability θ is obtained by substituting equations (3) to (9)
into equation (2):
U (θ) = βθ − υe + δβ (1 + υα)θ (10)
Note that savings s cancel out because they are augmented and discounted by the same market interest
rate r. Hence, they only represent transfers from one period to another without inﬂuence on total utility.
Firms are risk-neutral and maximize the sum of their discounted proﬁts over both periods:39
π(θ) = π + δπ′ (11)
In both periods, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is equal to the diﬀerence between revenue and costs per worker. Hence,
36Our model does not consider search frictions which implies an identical matching probability equal to one for all workers.
Alternatively, the probability of a match in period 2 may explicitly depend on the worker’s status of employment in
period 1. Diﬀerent matching probabilities can be justiﬁed by diﬀerent frictions in searching for employment. Mincer (1989)
empirically conﬁrms that the probability of unemployment decreases with education. In this context, Brown and Kaufold
(1988) stress that the possibility of unemployment reduces expected returns to education. Hence, the return to education
is based on higher productivity as well as higher employment probability (Bloch and Smith (1977)).
37Formally, this means
∂(θ′−θ)
∂θ = α > 0. Intuitively, the accumulation of new skills is easier when more skills are already
available. This relationship is also suggested by Ben-Porath (1967) and Mincer (1997). Because the parameter α determines
the productivity and thus the wage in period 2, it constitutes the key determinant of the return to education as analyzed
in the theory of human capital (c.f. Mincer (1974)).
38This assumption is analytically equivalent to the implication that the amount of training at the intensive margin is
independent of the worker’s ability and thus identical for each worker. This approach is in line with other models of human
capital formation over the life-cycle. In almost the same manner. Ben-Porath (1967) and Heckman (1976) assume that the
absolute (and not the relative) increase in human capital depends on the existing stock of human capital (which can be
interpreted as initial ability). In Acemoglu (1997) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1998), there is no individual ability so that
the relative gain in productivity is identical for all workers.
39The production side is modeled similar to Malcomson, Maw, and McCormick (2003). From the ﬁrm’s point of view,
the worker’s ability can be interpreted as individual productivity.
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Figure 2: The First-Best Optimum
the proﬁts in both periods depend on the worker’s productivity in the following manner:






= (1 − β)θ
′ = (1 − β)(1 + υα)θ (13)
Altogether, total proﬁts of a ﬁrm that produces with a worker of ability θ is equal to
π(θ) = (1 + δ (1 + υα))(1 − β)θ (14)
4.2 The First-Best Optimum (FB)
In the ﬁrst-best optimum, the total surplus of workers and ﬁrms is maximized. The overall welfare is
equal to the sum of the aggregate utility of all workers and the aggregate proﬁts of all ﬁrms over both
periods. Obviously, there is no unemployment in the ﬁrst-best optimum (i.e. uFB = 0) because each
unemployed worker would be equivalent to lost productivity. Each trained worker generates output equal
to his productivity θ during the apprenticeship and (1 + α)θ after the apprenticeship has been completed.
However, the ﬁnancial burden e has to be borne by the workers.
In the case of regular work, a worker generates the individual output θ in both periods. In the
following, we assume that θ
FB is the welfare maximizing pivotal ability40 between apprenticeship training
and regular work. Hence, the optimal number of apprentices in the ﬁrst period is nFB = 1−θ
FB.41 This
















In order to determine θ












40Hanushek, Leung, and Yilmaz (2003) refer to it as "ability cutoﬀ".
41More accurately, nFB describes the mass of apprentices in the ﬁrst-best optimum. In the following, we will neglect this
inaccuracy.
42Note that the density function of individual abilities is f (θ) = 1.




FB = e − δαθ
FB = 0 (17)
Solving for θ
FB yields the ﬁrst-best number of apprenticeship training positions.







In the ﬁrst-best optimum, the pivotal ability between apprenticeship training and regular work is
increasing in e because higher training costs make it less proﬁtable to provide apprenticeship training
to workers. However, θ
FB is decreasing in the productivity-enhancement α because the productivity
of trained workers becomes larger and thus the return to education is increased. Just as well, θ
FB is
decreasing in the discount factor because an increase in δ is equivalent to a decrease in r. Hence, the
welfare in period 2 is discounted less and thus weighted to a greater extent.
By substituting (18) into equation (16), we obtain the ﬁrst-best level of overall welfare.










4.3 The Laissez-Faire Equilibrium (LF)
4.3.1 The Pivotal Abilities with Laissez-Faire
Without government intervention, workers never prefer to stay unemployed since this would be equivalent
to receiving zero income. In the case of regular work, they receive wages equal to the Nash bargaining
solution in both periods. However, workers will prefer to be trained in period 1 if their total utility
according to equation (10) is bigger with apprenticeship training (i.e. υ = 1) than with regular work (i.e.
υ = 0).
Deﬁnition 1 The pivotal ability θ
LF is deﬁned to be the lowest ability that decides to receive apprentice-
ship training. A worker prefers apprenticeship training to regular work if his utilities over both periods
solve
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Figure 3: The Laissez-Faire Equilibrium
Like θ
FB, the pivotal ability θ
LF is increasing in the training costs and decreasing in the productivity-
enhancement of apprenticeship training and the discount factor. Furthermore, θ
LF is decreasing in the
worker’s bargaining power β. The case β = 1 implies zero rents for the ﬁrms and the absence of labor
market frictions so that the number of apprenticeship training positions achieves its ﬁrst-best level, i.e.
nLF = nFB. However, for β < 1 the training decision of workers implies θ
LF > θ
FB and thus is distorted
compared to the ﬁrst-best optimum. This ineﬃciency arises because workers only consider their higher
wages in period 2 but do not take into account increased proﬁts of ﬁrms by the output share (1 − β).
Hence, workers underinvest in the acquisition of human capital. The diﬀerence between nLF and nFB
and thus the degree of distortion become larger the lower the worker’s bargaining power β.
Additionally, we have to consider the labor market decision of ﬁrms. As shown by equation (14), no
ﬁrm will leave the market because it is always possible to make positive proﬁts by employing the worker
regularly. Furthermore, each ﬁrm prefers apprenticeship training to regular work because productivity
and thus proﬁts in period 2 are increased.
4.3.2 Overall Welfare with Laissez-Faire
In the ﬁrst period, nLF = 1 − θ
LF workers are trained while all other workers are employed regularly.
With respect to the training decision at the extensive margin, the number of apprenticeship training
positions is distorted compared to its ﬁrst-best optimum, i.e. nLF < nFB. However, like in the ﬁrst-best
optimum there is no unemployment (i.e. uLF = uFB = 0) because workers and ﬁrms always prefer regular
work to market exit. This situation is illustrated in ﬁgure 3. Hence, in the laissez-faire equilibrium, the















The ﬁrst integral in equation (21) describes the discounted aggregate utility of regular workers without
an apprenticeship training position. These unskilled workers receive wages equal to the Nash bargaining
solution βθ in both periods which adds up to the present value of (1 + δ)βθ for all workers with individual
ability below θ
LF. The second integral describes the discounted aggregate utility of workers who receive
apprenticeship training in the ﬁrst period. These workers with θ ≥ θ
LF have to bear the training costs
e in period 1. In the second period, their productivity is increased by the factor (1 + α). All wages
16correspond to the Nash bargaining solution so that the wages of the trained workers are increased by the
same factor (1 + α) compared to the wages of unskilled workers.


















In equation (22), the ﬁrst integral is equal to the aggregate proﬁts of ﬁrms that employ unskilled workers
regularly. These proﬁts correspond to the Nash bargaining solution, i.e. the fraction (1 − β) determines
the proﬁt of the ﬁrms in both periods. The second integral is equal to the aggregate proﬁts of those ﬁrms
that provide apprenticeship training in period 1 and thus enjoy the higher productivity of their trained
workers in period 2.
Altogether, the overall welfare in the laissez-faire equilibrium is determined by the aggregate welfare
of workers and the aggregate welfare of ﬁrms as shown by equations (21) and (22). Hence, the overall



























Note that the worker’s bargaining power β cancels out because it only determines how the output is
divided between workers and ﬁrms. By substituting the pivotal ability θ
LF into equation (24) we obtain
the following result.












4.4 The Equilibrium with Unemployment Beneﬁts (UB)
Unfortunately, the German labor markets are hardly characterized by the laissez-faire equilibrium de-
termined in the previous section. As discussed in section 3.2, labor markets are heavily regulated and
distorted by social beneﬁts that change the labor market decision of workers. For this reason, we incor-
porate into our model unemployment beneﬁts z that are paid to all unemployed workers in period 2.43
43In order to keep calculations as simple as possible, we concentrate on period 2 and do not consider unemployment
beneﬁsts in period 1.
17In accordance with the German system of social security (cf. section 3.2), z is identical for all workers
and thus independent of the labor income in period 1. We assume that the government cannot observe
why workers stay unemployed and thus also supports those workers who voluntarily refuse to work in
order to become eligible for social beneﬁts. The public expenditures for the unemployment beneﬁts in
the second period are ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax T that is levied on all workers independent of their
status of employment. Hence, unemployment beneﬁts z describe the gross transfer while unemployed
workers receive net payments of z′ = z − T.
4.4.1 The Pivotal Abilities with Unemployment Beneﬁts
Obviously, the labor market decision of ﬁrms is not aﬀected by the implementation of unemployment
beneﬁts. Also, the pivotal ability of workers between apprenticeship training and regular work remains
the same because θ
LF is not aﬀected by z. Hence, there are no additional distortions in the number
of apprenticeship training positions. However, there are some low-ability workers who decide to stay
unemployed in the second period because their utility is higher by receiving unemployment beneﬁts than
by working regularly. These distortions arise because z deﬁnes the reservation wage and thus determines
the labor force participation of workers. In other words, unemployment beneﬁts generate individual
participation tax rates τUB which are higher the lower the individual ability θ





In line with Boone and Bovenberg (2004), the participation constraint is binding at the bottom of
the skill distribution.45 The pivotal ability between regular work and unemployment is described by the
following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2 With unemployment beneﬁts, the pivotal ability θ
UB is deﬁned to be the lowest ability that
decides to work regularly. A worker prefers regular work to unemployment if his utilities over both periods
solve






The pivotal ability between regular work and unemployment is increasing in z because higher unem-
ployment beneﬁts make it more attractive to stay outside the labor market. However, θ
UB is decreasing
in β because more workers will decide to work regularly if their bargaining power and thus their wages
44The participation tax rate is deﬁned as the average tax rate on labor market participation (Keuschnigg (2005)). In line
with Eissa, Kleven, and Kreiner (2005), the labor supply at the extensive margin is linked to the participation tax rate.
Note that the participation tax rate is zero in the laissez-faire equilibrium, i.e. τLF = 0.
45In Immervoll, Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2005), the labor supply decision at the extensive margin is driven by ﬁxed
costs of work eﬀort. In our approach, each worker decides on his labor market participation depending on his labor income
and the level of unemployment beneﬁts.
180 LF θ
1
trained workers(UB) ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿
unskilled workers(UB) ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿
unemployed workers(UB) ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
UB θ
Figure 4: The Equilibrium with Unemployment Beneﬁts




4.4.2 Overall Welfare with Unemployment Beneﬁts
The number of trained workers is the same as in the laissez-faire equilibrium, i.e. nUB = nLF =
1 − θ
LF. However, the implementation of unemployment beneﬁts generates (voluntary) unemployment
in the second period among those workers with individual ability below θ
UB: uUB = θ
UB > 0 = uFB.
Hence, with respect to labor supply at the extensive margin, labor market participation is too low and
thus unemployment is too high compared to the ﬁrst-best optimum. Only those workers with an ability
above θ
UB are employed regularly in period 2. This situation is illustrated in ﬁgure 4. In period 1, there
are no unemployment beneﬁts so that all low-ability workers are working regularly.
By proceeding in the same manner as in the case of laissez-faire, the aggregate welfare of workers with





















Note that the labeling at the bottom refers to the worker’s status of employment in period 2. The ﬁrst
integral in equation (28) is equal to the aggregate utility of workers staying unemployed in the second
period, the second one describes the aggregate utility of workers employed regularly in both periods and
the third integral is equal to the aggregate utility of trained workers. Note that each worker has to pay
the lump-sum tax T.





















The ﬁrst integral in equation (29) is equal to the aggregate proﬁts of ﬁrms meeting low-ability workers
who prefer to stay unemployed in the second period, which implies zero proﬁts for the ﬁrms. The second
46This assumption implies that the unemployment beneﬁts do not exceed some critical level, i.e. z ≤ θFB. Furthermore,
the pivotal ability θUB
A=U ≡ e+δz
δβ(1+α) between apprenticeship training and unemployment lies between θUB and θLF. Without
the assumption, we would have to consider the second case θLF < θUB
A=U < θUB which is economically less important.
19integral describes the aggregate proﬁts of ﬁrms meeting workers who prefer to work regularly in both
periods and the third integral is equal to the aggregate proﬁts of ﬁrms meeting high-ability workers who
prefer to receive apprenticeship training.
In order to calculate the overall welfare with unemployment beneﬁts, we have to consider the public
budget constraint. The public expenditures for unemployment beneﬁts are ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxation
of all workers independent of their status of employment. Hence, we omit further labor market distortions
that would be generated by taxing only those workers inside the labor market and thus increasing the















By summing up the aggregate welfare of workers and ﬁrms, the overall welfare with unemployment
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By substituting the pivotal abilities θ
LF and θ
UB into equation (33), we obtain the following result.




















Comparing equations (25) and (34) demonstrates that the implementation of unemployment beneﬁts
decreases overall welfare because the working incentives for low-ability workers are reduced. For all
workers with individual ability below θ
UB, the wage that could be earned by working regularly falls
below the level of unemployment beneﬁts z. Hence, these workers can increase their utility by staying
outside the labor market. This ineﬃciency in the labor supply decision constitutes the necessary condition
for welfare-enhancing government interventions.
Naturally, labor market distortions would be reduced by lowering the level of unemployment beneﬁts.
20However, if the level of unemployment beneﬁts cannot be reduced by the government as suggested by
Boone and Bovenberg (2004), tax credits are one possible policy instrument to move the economy towards
its ﬁrst-best optimum by decreasing the number of unemployed workers. Hence, the welfare implications
of tax credits are analyzed in the following section.
5 The Welfare Analysis of Tax Credits (TC)
Tax credits imply that the government pays a subsidy to each worker who is employed regularly in the
second period and whose labor income I does not exceed the critical income level ¯ I. By paying low-
skilled workers a subsidy S in addition to their individual labor income, formerly unemployed workers
are motivated to enter the labor market because this "combined wage" makes them better oﬀ than
unemployment beneﬁts. Following the propositions of Sinn, Holzner, Meister, Ochel, and Werding (2006),
tax credits are designed in terms of a NIT for those workers who stay inside the labor market. This design
implies that all working (!) individuals receive a basic lump-sum transfer y which thus corresponds to the
guaranteed income of each employed worker. Furthermore, the individual subsidy decreases continuously
with labor income, i.e. it phases out at rate s up to the critical income level ¯ I. This smooth reduction
of the subsidy with rising income avoids undesirable jumps in the distribution of net incomes.47 In
contradiction to the traditional NIT, tax credits are only directed to net beneﬁciaries, while workers with
labor income above ¯ I are not aﬀected.48
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with y as the basic transfer and s as the phase-out rate of the tax credits. This subsidy scheme is
illustrated in ﬁgure 5.
Therefore, there is a critical ability ¯ θ that indicates the worker just receiving zero subsidy. All workers
with higher ability than ¯ θ receive no subsidy. The critical income level ¯ I is equal to
y
s which implies that
the critical ability is deﬁned by ¯ θ ≡
y
sβ. In line with Hanushek, Leung, and Yilmaz (2003), each unskilled
worker is subsidized, i.e. the critical ability exceeds the pivotal ability between apprenticeship training
47If abilities are continuously distributed and not observable by the government, this transfer scheme is analytically
equivalent to a lump-sum subsidy which is constant up to some critical level of individual labor income. Each worker with
labor income above this critical level can imitate a lower ability in order to become eligible for the subsidy. Hence, the
additional income due to the subsidy become smaller the higher the true ability of the worker and thus the higher the
income loss necessary to fall below the critical level of income.
48In Hanushek, Leung, and Yilmaz (2003), the NIT is applied to all workers, i.e. workers with high income are taxed.
However, paying a subsidy to low-income workers does not necessarily imply that high-income workers have to be taxed
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Figure 5: Tax Credits Depending on Labor Income
and regular work: ¯ θ ≥ θ








y + (1 − s)βθ
′ if θ
′ ≤ ¯ θ
βθ
′ if θ
′ > ¯ θ
￿
(36)
The relationship between individual labor income (I) and total income including the tax credits (I + S)
is graphically illustrated in ﬁgure 6.
According to Hausman (1985), the basic transfer is much more important for the labor supply response
of low-income workers than the phase-out rate because the labor supply adjustments take place at the
extensive margin. Hence, in our formal analysis, we concentrate on y and the optimal level of the basic
transfer.50
5.1 The Pivotal Abilities with Tax Credits
As in section 4.4, public expenditures for unemployment beneﬁts and tax credits are ﬁnanced by lump-
sum taxation of all workers independent of their status of employment. In line with Boone and Bovenberg
(2004) and Boone and Bovenberg (2006), the level of social assistance is taken as given by the government.
Hence, the worker still receives unemployment beneﬁts z in the case of unemployment. As a consequence
of the tax credits, the worker’s decisions between apprenticeship training, regular work and unemployment
are modiﬁed. The corresponding pivotal abilities are described by the following deﬁnition.
49This relationship is implied by the basic transfer exceeding some lower bound: y ≥ s e
δα. Furthermore, also in line with
Hanushek, Leung, and Yilmaz (2003), we assume that there are some high-income workers who receive zero subsidy, i.e.
¯ θ < 1.
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Figure 6: Total Income with Tax Credits
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Figure 7: The Equilibrium with Tax Credits
Deﬁnition 3 With tax credits, a worker prefers apprenticeship training to regular work if51





δβ (α + s)
(37)
With tax credits, a worker prefers regular work to unemployment if











A . This situation is is
illustrated in ﬁgure 7.52
51We concentrate on those workers who receive no subsidy with increased productivity but a positive amount of subsidy
without. This situation is implied by footnote 49.
52Note that the pivotal ability θTC
A=U =
e+δ(z−y)




235.2 The Equilibrium with Tax Credits
Tax credits aim at reducing the number of unemployed workers with low ability. Indeed, the pivotal
ability between regular work and unemployment is decreased, i.e. θ
TC
U = uTC < uUB. Hence, labor
market distortions are reduced and thus the equilibrium approaches the ﬁrst-best optimum with zero
unemployment. The reason is that the subsidy S lowers the participation tax rates τTC for all beneﬁciaries






This reduction in the participation tax rate is equivalent to an increase in the opportunity costs of
unemployment. Hence, some low-skilled workers who were unemployed in the equilibrium without tax
credits now decide to enter the labor market.
On the other hand, the pivotal ability between apprenticeship training and regular work is increased,
i.e. there are less workers that prefer apprenticeship training to regular work because the opportunity
costs of apprenticeship training are increased (nTC = 1−θ
TC
A < nUB). Hence, compared to the equilibria
with laissez-faire and with unemployment beneﬁts, the number of apprenticeship training positions is
further distorted compared to the ﬁrst-best optimum. All workers with individual ability θ
TC
U ≤ θ < θ
TC
A
are employed regularly in period 1.






















[(1 + δ(1 − s)(1 + α))βθ − e + δ(y − T)]dθ
￿ ￿￿ ￿




[(1 + δ (1 + α))βθ − e − δT]dθ
￿ ￿￿ ￿
trained workers without tax credits
Again, the labeling at the bottom refers to the worker’s status of employment in period 2. The ﬁrst
integral in equation (40) is equal to the aggregate utility of low-ability workers who stay unemployed
in period 2 and the second one describes the aggregate utility of workers employed regularly in both
periods. The third and the fourth integral describe the aggregate utility of trained workers. While the
third integral is equal to the aggregate utility of trained workers who are eligible for tax credits because
their labor income falls below the critical income level ¯ I, the fourth one covers those workers who receive
zero subsidy.


























24The ﬁrst integral in equation (41) is equal to the aggregate proﬁts of ﬁrms meeting those workers who
prefer to stay unemployed in period 2. The second integral describes the aggregate proﬁts of ﬁrms
producing with regular work in both periods and the third integral is equal to the aggregate proﬁts of
ﬁrms meeting high-ability workers who prefer to receive apprenticeship training in period 1.
In order to determine the overall welfare with tax credits, we have to consider the total amount of un-
employment beneﬁts and tax credits which are ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxation of all workers independent































By summing up the aggregate welfare of workers and ﬁrms, the overall welfare with tax credits depends


























[(1 + δ (1 − sβ)(1 + α))θ − e + δ (y − T)]dθ
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[(1 + δ (1 + α))θ − e − δT]dθ
￿ ￿￿ ￿
trained workers without tax credits














[(1 + δ(1 + α))θ − e]dθ (45)
In order to determine the optimal basic transfer, we have to maximize (45) with respect to y:
max
y WTC (y) =
1
2














The implementation of tax credits solves a trade-oﬀ with respect to overall welfare. On the one hand,
tax credits are welfare-enhancing because they decrease the number of unemployed workers in period 2.
On the other hand, tax credits increase the opportunity costs of training, which implies that less workers
are willing to receive apprenticeship training. Diﬀerentiating equation (46) with respect to y yields the
53Like in the previous section with unemployment beneﬁts, we omit further labor market distortions that would be



































Note that the partial derivatives have the following sign:
∂θTC
U
∂y < 0 and
∂θTC
A
∂y > 0. Equation (47)
compares the marginal beneﬁts and the marginal costs of an increase in y. On the left hand side, the
marginal beneﬁts are shown: there are less unemployed workers because the number of workers employed
regularly is increased at the lower end by (−
∂θTC
U
∂y ) which generates additional productivity δ per unit of
initial ability. The (net) marginal costs of an increase in y are shown on the right hand side and consist
of two eﬀects with opposite signs that both accrue because the number of regular workers is increased
at the upper end by
∂θTC
A
∂y . According to the ﬁrst summand, there is a productivity loss of δα per unit
of initial ability due to those workers who now reject apprenticeship training and thus no longer show
increased productivity in the second period. However, the decrease in apprenticeship training positions
also implies that aggregate training costs are reduced by e per worker formerly receiving apprenticeship
training.





A into equation (47) and solving for y.54




(1 + α)(α + s2)
z + (1 − s)
2 (α + s)β − α
δ (1 + α)(α + s2)
e (48)
By choosing the basic transfer at least as high as the level of unemployment beneﬁts, it is possible
to achieve zero unemployment. However, because y∗ is lower than z for any s < 1, the reintegration of
those workers at the bottom of the ability-distribution into the labor market is not optimal. Because
the costs in terms of decreased human capital formation are too high, it is more eﬃcient to leave aside
those workers with the lowest productivities. The comparative statics are illustrated in the following
proposition.

















The optimal basic transfer is increasing in z in order to countervail the detrimental eﬀects of unem-
ployment beneﬁts on the number of regular workers. This result is completely in line with Boone and
Bovenberg (2006) who demonstrate that, at high levels of social assistance, tax credits and traditional
social beneﬁts constitute complements: tax credits aim at oﬀsetting the impact of social assistance on the
labor supply decision at the extensive margin. With respect to empirical evidence for the UK, Blundell
and Hoynes (2001) show that the positive impact of tax credits on labor force participation is reduced by
the existence of other social beneﬁts. In this context, Sinn, Holzner, Meister, Ochel, and Werding (2006)
propose to combine the implementation of tax credits with a reduction in unemployment beneﬁts. This
reduction in z would decrease the optimal basic transfer and thus lower the negative eﬀects of tax credits
on human capital formation. Furthermore, y∗ is increasing in s because greater deductions from labor
income require a more generous basic transfer in order to reduce unemployment by the same amount.
Because apprenticeship training becomes more expensive and thus, the decline in apprenticeship training
positions becomes less costly, the optimal basic transfer is increasing in e. On the other hand, the opti-
mal basic transfer is decreasing in α because the productivity-loss due to less trained workers in period
2 becomes larger.
5.3 Unemployment with Optimal Tax Credits
The implementation of tax credits aims at increasing labor force participation at the extensive margin
by reducing the number of unemployed workers. By implementing tax credits with the optimal basic
transfer y∗, unemployment is reduced at the cost of decreased human capital formation.





However, the number of apprenticeship training positions is decreased to
(nTC)∗ = 1 −
e + δy∗
δβ (α + s)
< nUB (54)
55The caculations are shown in appendix B.
27Suppose that the government aims at reducing the number of unemployed workers to the target labor




U = ˆ θ (55)
In order to achieve this target, the government chooses the phase-out rate s subject to the optimal basic




ˆ s = s(ˆ θ, y∗) (56)
In a nutshell, the government can realize its target labor force participation by setting the basic
transfer according to equation (48) and the phase-out rate according to equation (56).
5.4 The Implementation of Minimum Wages
As discussed in section 3.2, there is no legally mandated minimum wage in Germany. In the context
of recent political discussions about tax credits, the implementation of additional minimum wages is
proposed in order to guarantee a minimum level of income even for unskilled workers. However, this
policy measure would change the labor market decision of ﬁrms. Minimum wages prevent ﬁrms from
paying wages which are below a deﬁned minimum, thereby eliminating jobs with very low productivity
and thus creating involuntary unemployment among the low-ability workers (Immervoll, Kleven, Kreiner,
and Saez (2005)).
Deﬁnition 4 The pivotal ability θ
MW is deﬁned to be the lowest ability that ﬁrms decide to employ
regularly if they face a minimum wage m. A ﬁrm prefers regular work to market exit if its proﬁts over
both periods solve
(1 + δ)(θ − m) ≥ 0
θ ≥ θ
MW ≡ m (57)
Hence, all workers with ability θ < m stay unemployed because their output is lower than the minimum
wage the ﬁrms have to pay. Because of the minimum wage it is no longer possible for low-ability workers
to get out of unemployment by accepting a wage below m. Therefore, unemployment is bounded below
because it is not possible to further reduce unemployment by increasing the basic transfer y. Hence, the
optimal basic transfer with minimum wages is bounded above because uMW = m can be achieved by
setting the basic transfer equal to yMW = z − (1 − s)βm.
Proposition 8 With minimum wages, the optimal basic transfer is equal to
yMW = Min{y∗, z − (1 − s)βm} (58)






As shown by equation (59), the implementation of minimum wages increases unemployment if m
exceeds the critical level (uTC)∗ which is equal to the number of unemployed workers with tax credits
but without minimum wages. In this case, the optimal basic transfer is reduced according to equation
(58). Compared to the situation without minimum wages, there are additional downward rigidities in
wages across skill categories so that the positive eﬀects of tax credits on the labor supply of low-skilled
workers are counteracted.
6 Conclusion
This paper ranks among a new line of research that transcends the boundaries of labor economics and
public ﬁnance. With respect to the German labor market, Sinn (2002) as well as Schöb and Weimann
(2003) suggest that the only possibility to lower the poverty trap and to reactivate the low-skilled part
of the labor force is by subsidizing work instead of unemployment. Our paper presents a two-period
partial-equilibrium model that systematically compares the costs and beneﬁts of tax credits which are
granted to low-skilled workers. As proposed by Sinn, Holzner, Meister, Ochel, and Werding (2006), tax
credits are designed in terms of a NIT for workers in employment.
In the laissez-faire equilibrium, there is no unemployment but the number of apprenticeship training
positions is too low compared to the ﬁrst-best optimum. Unfortunately, the implementation of unemploy-
ment beneﬁts generates unemployment among low-ability workers because private employment is crowded
out by the welfare state. The implementation of tax credits succeeds in reducing this unemployment by
increasing the labor supply incentives of low-skilled workers at the extensive margin. However, the train-
ing decision of high-ability workers is distorted and the number of apprenticeship training positions is
decreased relative to the laissez-faire equilibrium. In a nutshell, increased labor force participation is
achieved at the cost of reduced human capital formation by workers inside the labor market. This result
is in line with Heckman, Lochner, and Cossa (2002).
Our formal analysis is based on recent training literature with oligopsonistic labor markets but the
model is adapted to the German system of apprenticeship training and social security. The implementa-
tion of tax credits in terms of a NIT solves a trade-oﬀ with respect to overall welfare. While tax credits
reduce the number of unemployed workers at the extensive margin, they increase at the same time the
opportunity costs of apprenticeship training, which implies that human capital formation is decreased.
Subject to this trade-oﬀ, we derive the optimal basic transfer of tax credits which is positively related
to the level of unemployment beneﬁts, the costs of apprenticeship training and the phase-out rate of the
tax credits. However, the optimal basic transfer depends negatively on the productivity-enhancement
of apprenticeship training. Altogether, in line with the empirical results of Eissa, Kleven, and Kreiner
(2004) and Immervoll, Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2005), the implementation of tax credits is justiﬁed on
theoretical grounds.
29Furthermore, the optimal basic transfer of tax credits is bounded above by the level of unemployment
beneﬁts which implies that the reintegration of those workers at the bottom of the ability-distribution into
the labor market is not optimal. Because the costs in terms of decreased human capital formation would be
too high, it is more eﬃcient to leave aside those workers with the lowest productivities. If the government
wants to realize a certain target labor force participation, it must also decide on the phase-out rate so that
the pivotal ability between regular work and unemployment decreases to the desired extent. However, the
additional implementation of minimum wages is counteractive to the reduction of unemployment because
ﬁrms would thus be prevented from employing workers with very low productivities.
In our model, the number of unemployed workers and the number of apprenticeship training positions
are endogenously determined and depend on the individual ability of workers. Nevertheless, the model
has been kept simple for expositional and calculational reasons. The theoretical results of our stylized
model only allow for qualitative conclusions concerning the implementation of tax credits in the context
of the German system of apprenticeship training and social security. In order to assess the quantitative
magnitude of these eﬀects, we would have to estimate the elasticities of the workers’ labor supply and
training responses at the extensive margin. However, the underlying insights into the model presented
here are robust to various types of generalization. Hence, they constitute a promising basis for policy
recommendations and for future research.
A Calculation of the Optimal Basic Transfer
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30B Comparative Statics of the Optimal Basic Transfer
It is important to analyze in which way the optimal basic transfer is aﬀected by changes in the key
parameters of the model. The comparative statics with respect to unemployment beneﬁts, phase-out
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= −(1 − s)2δs(α + s)z + [s(1 − s)
2 β + (α + s)(s(1 + β) − (1 − β)α)]e
δ[(1 + α)(α + s2)]2 < 0 (B4)
Note that the sign of the partial derivatives is unambiguous because the phase-out rate exceeds some
lower bound. This condition is implied by the assumption ¯ θ < 1.
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